Turkey is experiencing one of the hottest summers in recent years, not just in terms of weather but politically as well.
Since March 19, new waves of arrests have targeted opposition The Republican People's Party (CHP) mayors and their close associates almost every week. Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, President Erdoğan’s top rival, remains in jail awaiting trial on corruption charges, accusations he strongly denies.
For CHP and İmamoğlu, this is a “political coup” orchestrated by President Erdoğan, who they say is weaponizing the judiciary to eliminate his strongest contender because he knows he cannot defeat him at the ballot box. Sharing the same sentiment, hundreds of thousands took to the streets on the day of İmamoğlu’s arrest, and student-led protests quickly evolved into a nationwide anti-government movement, the largest since the Gezi Park protests in 2013. Four months on, people continue to express their discontent in various forms, viewing the crackdown as an attack on democracy.
Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) announced its decision to dissolve and lay down arms on May 12, following decades of conflict with the Turkish state that claimed tens of thousands of lives. The process, which began with an unexpected call by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, is now entering a critical phase, with a parliamentary commission set to discuss the next steps. While the PKK’s decision has been welcomed, recent polls show that a large segment of society remains skeptical about how the process is being handled and what its true motives are.
As these two parallel developments unfold, there are many unanswered questions about whether they are connected, where they are headed, and how they might impact other issues in Turkey.
For example, on July 21, during his return flight from Northern Cyprus, President Erdoğan was asked by accompanying journalists whether there could be new developments in European Union accession talks and visa liberalization if the government’s so-called “Terror-Free Turkey” process continues successfully.
Erdoğan responded by saying that Turkey is ready for full membership, and that the EU should not wait even a single day to revive and advance the negotiations — without requiring any new steps from Turkey.In the same week, Özgür Özel said that under a CHP government, Turkey would become a full member of the EU, calling it a promise to the country’s youth. He also criticized European leaders for their silence in the face of the March 19 process during his speech at the Socialist International Council Meeting held in Istanbul on May 24, saying, “In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”
In light of recent statements from Turkey and the broader political climate, Nacho Sánchez Amor — an experienced politician and the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey since 2019 — spoke to Fayn. We discussed Ankara’s stalled EU accession process, the government's ongoing crackdown on the opposition, and the “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative.
“The authoritarian trend in Turkey is there and it’s been deepening every week.”
“Turkey is ready for full membership,” President Erdoğan said on July 21. “If the Union approaches this matter in a strategic and visionary way, there are no obstacles preventing them from taking immediate action.” He also added, “Turkey is the last exit before the bridge for the EU.” I’m curious to hear your thoughts on these recent remarks. Is Turkey ready for EU membership?
The president used the expression ‘ready’. No, Turkey is not ready to join the European Union — I’m sorry.
Accession is about democracy. Membership is about democracy. And the current situation in domestic politics in Turkey is anything but democratic.
The authoritarian trend is there. It’s been deepening every week, with many decisions coming from those in power, meaning that Turkey is not ready in any way to join the European Union as a member.
Turkey is a very important neighbor, and we want to have the best relationship possible with Turkey. But these are completely different settings, different games, different rules.
As I said in Turkey, the road to Europe does not begin with the military complex, the defense industry, or drones. The path to Europe begins in Silivri.
It begins with compliance with the European Court of Human Rights and its rulings. It is inevitably linked to democratic standards in Turkey.
What we want are deeds. We need facts, not more love letters. We don’t like love letters — we receive a lot of love letters.
What we are expecting from Turkey is to behave as a candidate country. This has nothing to do with military, geopolitical, or any other kind of rationale.
I always use the same example:
Montenegro is a tiny country, not particularly important from the geostrategic point of view, not having a lot of military means, and a strong defense. But Montenegro is going to be a member of the European Union well ahead of Turkey, because they understood very well that to be a member of the European Union is about following and improving democratic standards.
I’m sure the president is fully aware of that. Membership is about democracy. There are no shortcuts—no alternative rationales or what the president calls “visionary” thinking.
We are still a club of democracies, and we want to remain that way. For that reason, our only visionary approach to the world is to protect our club of democracies.
We already face problems with the erosion of democratic standards in some current member states. We don’t want to repeat that mistake. We must be sure that any country joining the Union is a mature, irreversible democracy.
This is not about being visionary or strategic. That kind of rationale always tries to escape from the real exam: the current state of democratic standards.
They know for sure what they have to do. They know for sure what it is to follow the accession process. They know for sure what it means to be a fully democratic country. Because Turkey once was.
Turkey was a better democracy. It was an open country. It had an inclusive political system. Not that long ago—I’m not talking about the Ottoman period. I’m talking about 20–25 years ago. But things started to change for the worse after the Gezi Park protests, and that was a political decision.
When the president says, “We are ready,” I hope he’s expressing a kind of political will. But that alone is not enough.
You have to demonstrate to the world—and to European countries—that you are improving your democracy. Because that is the only way. There are no shortcuts, no alternative paths, no workarounds.
The only way to become a member of the European Union is to be a fully, irreproachable, and irreversible democracy.
“This is not the last train for the European Union. I’m very sorry to say this, but it’s probably the last train for Turkey.”
Listening to statements such as President Erdoğan’s, many people in Turkey tend to believe that their country has fulfilled its responsibilities, but the European Union has kept them out of the club. What would you say to those in Turkey who feel this way?
This sentiment has been carefully fed by the power.
The 90 percent of the press talking on behalf of the palace, and if you’re having a rain shower for years, dismissing the European Union, it’s normal that public opinion would not be very keen about joining the union.
But we don't have a moral obligation to transform Turkey into a democracy. This is completely on the side of Turkish society. You, your country, your nation, your society has to decide whether they want this way of life and political system or they want the other one, the Russian one.
Turkey allowed a constitutional reform that was clearly intended to reinforce the autocratic trends. And it was passed. It was a decision of society, completely contrary to the European path the country follows.
I hope that nobody in Turkey thinks they are only a democracy as a tool to become a member of the European Union. No, no, no! You have to decide: Do you want to be a democracy? Because this is the form of social relations that you want for Turkey. And then, if you are a democracy, you are entitled to be a member of the European Union.
We don’t have the moral obligation to take Turkey by the laps and drag it inside the European Union. This is a completely sovereign decision. What kind of society do you want for yourself?
I’m from Spain, and we decided. My democracy is a relatively young democracy. We decided to be a democracy. And then, we applied to the European Union. And we were prepared. But the first thing was that we wanted to escape from Francoism, from dictatorship, and become a democracy. That was the big decision. Joining the European Union was the next step, an option.
Switzerland is a democracy, and they decided not to join the European Union. But it’s clear that they decided to be a democracy.
I’m a little bit tired of repeating this again and again. You can’t play chess with the rules of poker. These are two different settings. You want to be a member. This is an accession process. It's normative. It's not transactional. It's not something to bargain about. You have to comply, like Montenegro.
And then there's the other table. We want to have a better relationship with Turkey—on defense, on trade, on human relations, on whatever you consider useful. But these are different settings with different rules. That side is transactional. We want to talk about agriculture, about the customs union, about visa liberalization, we can talk about everything. That’s transactional.But the other part, the accession process, is not transactional. It's normative. If you don’t comply with the benchmarks related to the accession process, you are not going to be a member of the European Union.
And when the president says, “We are ready”—no, it’s not true. Turkey is not ready. But at least, if that means some kind of political will to reinstate, to put the accession process back on track, then you’re very welcome.
This is not the last train for the European Union. I’m very sorry to say this, but it’s probably the last train for Turkey. I’m not sure there will be another period of appetite for enlargement in the European Union. Right now, there is an appetite to enlarge, and there are nine countries around Turkey who are using this opportunity, doing things properly, and conducting the accession process without meddling with other rationales.
What we need, if you want, is to address the real issue: the failure of democratic standards in Turkey over the last 10 years.
‘‘To talk again about approaching the European Union under these circumstances would be humorous, if it weren’t causing so much pain across so many parts of society.’’
Turkey’s EU accession process started almost 20 years ago. At the time, it was expected to be completed within 10 years. However, in all this time, only 16 out of 35 chapters have been opened, and just one has been completed. What do you think went wrong, and when?
Things started to go in the wrong direction after the Gezi Park protests—not after the coup attempt, but after Gezi.
I know that having Cyprus on board as a member of the European Union without having solved the issue was, and still is, difficult for Turkey. I fully understand that this is a big problem for Turkey, and it’s something we have to try to overcome jointly. But to me, this is a problem that is not linked to democratic standards.
The problem after Gezi is that, for some reason, President Erdoğan noted—or realized—that the balance of power was threatened. And for that reason, he decided to embark on, and began conducting, a fully authoritarian drift.
It is probably because Gezi showed a very clear discontent among many people about, let’s say, the direction of the country. That created a lot of anxiousness within the power. And they decided, simply, to slowly abandon the process of approaching the democratic standards of other democracies. After the coup attempt, there was a period of intensified repression, not only through laws, but also through practices.
Laws, like the trustee law, have remained in the legal system. They were introduced, drafted and depicted as tools to fight the coup. But listen: just five days after the decrees were approved to deal with the plotters, on the fifth day, the decree was used for the first time against a professor of linguistics. An older lady, a professor of linguistics. Nothing to do with the coup. Meaning, the legal system that was created to defend the Republic against the plotters was immediately used against others, against any kind of criticism.
During that period, there were many attacks, harassment, and prosecutions directed at people linked to the Kurdish movement, again, with nothing to do with the coup. So, things began to go wrong after Gezi, but the coup attempt accelerated the country’s authoritarian drift. It eventually culminated in the constitutional reform, which was clearly designed to steer the country toward a model of society similar to the Russian one. Meaning: a single man ruling with all the powers, all the tools, all the competencies. And even where those competencies didn’t exist formally, there was the political capacity to exert influence in every corner of the state and society.
That was the culmination of a process that started with Gezi and ended with the constitutional reform. After that, it was just a matter of putting the authoritarian system into practice—of implementing what had already been designed and planned that way.
To talk again about approaching the European Union under these circumstances would be humorous, if it weren’t so cruel, if it weren’t causing so much pain across so many parts of society.
Turkey’s accession negotiations were frozen in 2018, and there has been no progress since. What is the point of maintaining this process at this stage?
This is probably one of the most difficult dilemmas I have faced during my tenure in this role.
Is it worth continuing this cynical idea of keeping an open process that is designed never to reach membership, simply because it serves both sides functionally?
I reflected deeply on what to do, and my final conclusion—after some doubts—was that perhaps in the future, this could provide an opportunity for Turkey to return to the democratic path.
The second reason is the pro-European civil society. I’m not saying all of Turkish society is pro-European, but a very active segment is. I do not want to extinguish the hope of many people who believe that the European way of life could offer them vast freedoms and wealth.
The main reason for keeping the accession process frozen rather than killing it outright is to preserve the hope of many Turkish citizens who want a society similar to Europe.
For this reason, we have decided to continue waiting for a political window of opportunity, when some of Turkey’s leaders seriously decide to return to the accession process.
I’m not saying the only chance to get back on track is after the AKP’s rule. It could be under the AKP, but President Erdoğan must decide what role he wants to play in Turkey’s history. Does he want to be a leader who modernizes the country? Or the one who ultimately drifts it toward authoritarianism?
So, the reason we decided to keep the accession process as it is, is to not kill hope for the future.
‘‘Right now, Europe has a strong appetite for new members and every candidate country is moving forward. The only one not progressing is Turkey.’’
The opposition leader Özgür Özel recently said that Turkey will become a member of the European Union under a CHP government, and that this is his party’s promise to the country’s youth. Do you see a possibility for Turkey to join the EU under new leadership in the future?
Yes, why not? Listen, I’m one of the European politicians more committed to Turkey’s membership than many others, and I made sure that position was reflected in my report from the very beginning.
If Turkey fulfills the accession criteria, then at the end of the process, it cannot be blocked on the basis of demographics, culture, religion, or identity. No.
If we say to Turkey, “If you follow this path and meet the requirements, you’ll become a member,” then we have to be consistent. Religion or identity cannot enter into the equation. Turkey is entitled to become a member of the European Union.
Of course, I know that this enthusiasm has been deeply eroded after years of Turkey drifting into authoritarianism. But our commitment remains. It’s true that some leaders in the past, Sarkozy, for example, cooled support for Turkey’s accession. That’s a fact, and I find it regrettable. But leadership changes, and so does the mood.
Right now, Europe has a strong appetite for new members, as long as they comply with the accession criteria. This isn’t a blank check for membership, you have to meet the standards. But the appetite is there, and every candidate country is moving forward. The only one not progressing is Turkey.
Less talk, more action. That’s what matters.
As for the CHP, I know firsthand, because I’ve had several conversations with Özgür Özel, that they are deeply committed to the European path. Why? Because they rightly believe that if there is political will in the country, and if political life moves in that direction, Europe can help.
The problem arises when there is no real effort to meet EU standards. In that case, of course we’re more reluctant to engage. But if we see genuine political will, backed by real actions, reforms, and change, then the European Union will respond positively. We’ll be happy to engage.
So yes, I do believe there could be an opportunity in the future. And let me repeat: I’m not saying that CHP rule is the only path forward. Any government that is genuinely committed to the accession process can re-engage. Even the AKP, if there are changes, and there must be changes.
One more point that’s important to me: In many authoritarian countries, not just Turkey, take Georgia too, there’s this narrative that joining the EU means losing your identity. There was a recent poll in Turkey suggesting this fear: that EU membership would erode Turkish culture.
But look around. Did Spain lose flamenco? Did the French stop eating croissants for breakfast? Are the Nordics no longer eating reindeer? It’s a childish narrative. In Europe, we have the most secure framework for protecting cultural identity.
Our motto is “united in diversity.”
Every country has its own rules, background, and traditions. Some have Catholic roots, like Poland or Spain. Others come from Slavic or Anglo-Saxon traditions. Some speak Latin-based languages, others speak Finnish. Our teas, our wines, our ways of life, all of it is preserved.
So the idea that Turkey, or any country, would somehow lose its identity or sovereignty by joining the EU is simply not true. It’s just another childish fairy tale meant to dampen the longstanding enthusiasm of many in Turkish civil society who genuinely believe in the European project.
“Democracy isn’t just voting and counting. It’s everything that happens between elections. And in Turkey, what happens between elections is far from meeting the standards of a mature democracy.”
I’m also curious about your thoughts on the jailing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu as well as many other opposition mayors and their close associates on corruption and terrorism charges, accusations they strongly deny. This has sparked nationwide anti-government protests with many fearing this is an attempt to make democratic change through elections impossible. Do you agree?
I think that fear has come very late.
I know your elections quite well. They have never taken place on a level playing field, never.
The use of state power has been deep and far-reaching, especially when it comes to the media landscape, with media owners working hand-in-hand with the ruling power.
Public media is a joke. I remember during the second election of 2015, President Erdoğan was on TV the night before the vote for three or four hours.
Now, I do believe that the electoral system protects the people’s votes when they are cast. The issue is not about how the votes are counted. The problem lies in how the voters' will is shaped, in a political environment where parties don’t have equal access to the public.
I’m sure that, perhaps with minor irregularities, the votes are counted as they are cast. But that’s not the core issue. The real problem is what happens before election day.
True equal opportunity for political parties has never existed. And that’s why I say: this fear people now express, that democracy is being undermined, is coming very late.
Because, listen: when CHP won the local elections despite all the unfairness in the campaign, they were so happy with the result that they forgot to remind people: we won despite the lack of a level playing field.
And that was a mistake. Because you must remind people that if the campaign had been truly fair, the outcome might have been even better.
When it comes to elections in Turkey, the issue is that elections are treated as the final stage. But the real question is: how is the will of the people formed in a system where they do not have a genuinely free choice?
You have a press and media environment dominated by AKP voices, where the resources of the state are used in service of one party, where opposition candidates are harassed, where mayors are jailed.
Let’s be honest: you do not have irreproachable elections. Because elections are not just about what happens on voting day. They are about the entire process, from the very beginning to the end. And that’s why the concern shouldn’t just be about this or that event, it should cover the entire electoral process.
Even if the misuse of state resources or public media is “normal” in some authoritarian countries or less mature democracies, society must react. You can’t say, “Well, that’s just how things are, let’s work within the system.” No, the system must be challenged. Because you haven’t had genuinely fair elections in over a decade. And that’s a real problem for society.
Even if you have a vote-counting system that functions well, democracy is about what happens between elections, not just one day every four or five years. Democracy is about competition. It’s about freedom of expression. It’s about having access to the media, about being able to speak out without being prosecuted for criticism. And that’s why my message to the Turkish public is this: take care of the entire democratic process. Because democracy isn’t just voting and counting. It’s everything that happens between elections. And in Turkey, what happens between elections is far from meeting the standards of a mature democracy.
“İmamoğlu has been prosecuted because Yıldırım and Kurum failed.”
You visited Ekrem İmamoğlu in Silivri. How did you find him, and what did you talk about?
I have met him before, maybe three or four times, and I found him in a very fighting spirit, having a clear view as to why this piece of repression is affecting him, so that Erdoğan can run again as a candidate in a good position in the next election.
He was also very concerned because this process is affecting another 100 people, their families and children.
The persecution of İmamoğlu hasn’t started in the last months. He started to be prosecuted when he made a minor, naive criticism against the electoral officials saying that what they did was a foolish thing. To say to any official that what he does is a foolish thing is the normal way of conducting a democracy. We always say things to our politicians that, in Turkey, would probably be turned into criminal prosecutions. That is dire.
But why did İmamoğlu start to be prosecuted immediately after winning the second elections? Because there is a phrase haunting Erdoğan. This is a phrase that is a kind of ghost. It's “First Istanbul, and then Turkey.”
It was the phrase of Erdoğan and this phrase is haunting him because he knows for sure how ruling Istanbul is a key part of the entire architecture of political power in Turkey.
And why did they decide to prosecute him from the criminal point of view? I was very clear when I visited Silivri. İmamoğlu has been prosecuted because Yıldırım and Kurum failed. And then Erdoğan decided that the next contender of İmamoğlu was not going to be a politician, but a prosecutor, the “White Toros” prosecutor.
And for that reason, he sent this prosecutor to compete with him, misusing the means of the law to completely block the excellent political career of İmamoğlu.
Yıldırım, Kurum and the prosecutor. These are the three contenders that Ankara sent to Istanbul to try to get rid of this very important political figure that is İmamoğlu.
“The more you are depicted as an important partner, the less you are being considered as a candidate. This is a trap for Turkey.”
There is criticism towards the European leaders that they choose not to be very vocal about the government’s ongoing crackdown on the opposition in exchange for Turkey continuing to do the job with the migration deal. Indeed, European leaders were much more critical about the democratic backsliding in Turkey before. Why not now?
Yes, it's completely true and it’s disgusting that the level of criticism regarding the democratic standards and justice coming from the Commission, Council, Kaja Kallas or Ursula von der Leyen has been downgraded to silence.
When Erdoğan decided to go for the head of İmamoğlu, the rationale was that this is the right moment because the international community, especially the European Union, is not going to be very vocal, it's not going to be very critical. Of course, they would complain, but this is part of the plan.
What completely broke the plans of Erdoğan was domestic protests. The domestic protests were absolutely not expected and it reminded many of them of another Gezi.
In my view, they decided not to appoint a trustee to govern Istanbul because the scale of the protests inevitably brought back the idea of another Gezi and it was very scary for those in power.
But they are right about the lack of proper response coming from Europe. Why?
Well, because, as I said, Turkey could be an important partner in many fields. Also, the accession process is in a coma. This is something that has not been clearly understood by the people creating public opinion in Turkey. Meaning, if the accession process is frozen and nobody talks about it, the thinking is that let's create another agenda.
We have a relationship with Egypt. We have a relationship with Tunisia. We have a relationship with Kazakhstan. We have relations with many authoritarian countries. But we never talk about having them on board. We are talking in a very pragmatic way, the transactional way.
What can you offer us? What can we offer you? And as I said to many interlocutors, the more you are depicted as an important partner, the less you are being considered as a candidate. This is a trap for Turkey.
And for that reason, I welcome any statement coming from Erdoğan or Özel or whoever is saying, no, no, we want to be a member of the European Union. That's good. Because you have to underline and remind the European people that you are a candidate country.Ursula von der Leyen, she usually doesn’t mention Turkey as a candidate country when she talks. To me, this is disrespectful. I always criticize her for not mentioning Turkey as a candidate country. But politically, you have to be aware, the farther you are from being a member, the more you are being transformed into a neighbor and maybe a partner in many fields. Yes, there is a lot of pragmatism in the approach of the European Union lately because of the war, because of security concerns, because of many things.
It’s very easy for European countries to dismiss Turkey, because Turkey is doing the whole job. Nobody needs to come out and say in the public arena, as happened before with Sarkozy and others, we don't want Turkey on board. Why does the Austrian government have to come out talking about Turkey? Turkey is doing the thing. No conditions. Why?
But in this case, why don’t you remove the excuses from the EU’s hands by doing things properly? For example, visa liberalization. Why don't you comply with the six or seven benchmarks lacking? Why don’t you leave no excuses for the European side that says “No, if you don’t comply with the six benchmarks, you will not get any kind of visa liberalization.”
There is no more domestic terrorism in Turkey. There is no PKK. Why do you still have this anti-terror law? We had an ETA in Spain and when it was finished, we completely changed the mindset because we didn't have a domestic threat. Now, Turkey has the same threats that we could have in Paris, Madrid, or Bonn, or Oslo. It's international terrorists, Islamists, or jihadist terrorists, whatever you call it. But you don't have any reason that’s different from other countries to have this anti-terror law. But of course, if you are using anti-terror laws against lawyers, against journalists, against people tweeting on social media, the problem is not in Vienna. The problem is not in Paris. The problem is within your own country.
Okay, we can do things better, being very vocal and not using double standards, that's true, but at the same time, the other way around is true. Why don't you comply with things, leaving no excuses for the European side not wanting to examine the feasibility of having Turkey on board? This is another way to address the issue.
You said ‘no more PKK’. Following the group’s decision to dissolve, there are now preparations to form a commission in the National Assembly to discuss the next steps. Some are hopeful this process could lead to the democratization of the country, while others remain skeptical. What’s your view?
I think the rationale of Devlet Bahçeli’s invitation was the usual one: if we can attract the DEM Party to the process of reforming the constitution, allowing Erdoğan to be a candidate again without any kind of constitutional engineering maneuver, that could be good.
And that had some consequences. DEM has been protected, and CHP has become the prey for authoritarian practices. DEM, the former HDP, a party that has always been depicted as a ‘friend of terrorists’, has been expressly invited by Erdoğan to a parliamentary coalition: MHP, AKP, DEM. For the same reason, having a local political agreement, İmamoğlu has been accused of terrorism. This is another proof of how cynical the authoritarian practice can be.
On the other side, what is the real big thing here?
The rationale of the MHP, and maybe the AKP, reluctantly at first, was: let’s concede, let’s talk about some rights for the Kurdish people—cultural rights, maybe media, education—in exchange for having them on board for constitutional reform.
What completely broke this scenario was Abdullah Öcalan’s first statement. To put it in a nutshell: “This is not about the rights of my people. This is about the right of every Turkish citizen to live in a democracy.” That changed the setting completely. Because it was no longer about bargaining over Kurdish rights. The focus shifted toward the democratic framework of all of Turkey. And I think this is a good approach.
I don’t want to applaud Öcalan in any way. I think Öcalan is a terrorist. He’s a violent person linked to the death of many, many people on both sides. I don’t want to praise him in any way. But this approach completely changed the initial program of the government, which was: we can solve this with some minor concessions to the Kurdish people.
It’s good that this idea has also been underlined by CHP, that this is not only about concessions to a part of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. No, no, no. This is about the rights of every Turkish citizen: being Alevi, being Kurd, being Armenian. And that’s what created a kind of political tremor within the initial plan.
We welcome the beginning of this process. I noticed there was some discomfort in the DEM Party the last time I visited them, because the judicial reform didn’t include any kind of measure regarding how the activists and fighters are going to be included in the process. And this is a very important thing.
It has to be clear that this is a real opportunity for peace and not a trick to lure DEM into becoming part of a new majority with the AKP and MHP. I think CHP has to be included.
It’s good to have the National Assembly involved, and CHP has been invited from the beginning. I think this is the right setting. In this process there will inevitably be a lot of discreet conversations, but it’s good that in the end, Parliament will be the place where decisions are made.
Of course, we have not been involved in any way in the process. But if, in some way, the European Union can be of help, we are ready to engage if we’re requested to do so.
“In Europe, patriotism is not about the size of the flags. It's about the size of the pensions.”
My final question: What would your message be to people in Turkey who strive and fight for better democracy but feel exhausted and powerless in the face of intensifying government repression?
My message is to try to keep hope and to struggle to have a real democracy in Turkey. This is the first thing. Europe is an ulterior thing. To be or not to be a member is a decision. You have to decide what your model of society is: the Russian one or the European one.
The civil society in Turkey, luckily, has not been killed by the power, despite a lot of attempts. The appetite for freedom in many layers of society in Turkey is there.
And another piece of advice: never fall into the trap of choosing between being a wealthy society and being a free society. In Europe, we are wealthy societies with excellent security, a social system, pensions, health, and education, probably the best in the world. And we are enjoying freedoms and liberties.
The nationalist narrative tells citizens: “Okay, you might be enduring a difficult time, your salary might not be enough to see the end of the month, and you might be suffering from the increasing prices, but your country is very important in the world.” Or: “You don’t have the means to have a good quality of life, but your country has missiles.”
In Europe, patriotism is not about the size of the flags. It's about the size of the pensions. And we are as patriotic as anyone. But our understanding of being patriotic is to have a society with cohesion. We have a lot of military means, but for us the real thing is the pensions, health, education, subsidies for unemployed people, and having a decent way of life. And we're eager to help any candidate country and any neighbour to have this kind of society.
Yazan:
Şükrü Oktay Kılıç
2011 yılından beri gazetecilik yapıyor. Daha önce Radikal ve Al Jazeera gibi yayınlarda çalıştı. Yönetici direktörlüğünü yürüttüğü Fayn'ın aynı zamanda yazıişlerinde görev yapıyor.